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FAITH, HOPE, AND RATIONALITY 
OR 
PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE PERILS 
OF OCCAM’S RAZOR 
CYNTHIA R. FARINA* 
We do not know enough about the causes of variation to be 
rigidly bound by the law of parcimony.1 
 Every community of believers has a set of creation myths to ac-
count for the existence of the universe and to explain the nature and 
motives of the entities who inhabit it. 2 Such creation myths have both 
descriptive and predictive functions. Initially, they help the commu-
nity make sense of the world, imposing a comprehensible pattern on 
the chaos of external data. At least as important, they then allow the 
community to anticipate the course of future developments and to 
shape individual and communal behavior in ways designed to induce 
propitious outcomes and ward off bad ones. 
 This symposium is an opportunity for the community of those who 
believe in administrative law to reflect on the various creation myths 
of the administrative state. It is a chance to ask how well they serve 
us—that is, how accurately they describe modern regulatory institu-
tions, and how useful they are as guidance for making the regulatory 
universe a more benevolent place, in which government power is 
wielded for the public good rather than private gain. Professor 
Croley’s intriguing paper, Public Interested Regulation,3 invites us to 
ask these questions about what is probably the most powerful of our 
contemporary creation myths: public choice theory. 
 In the genesis stories of the administrative state, public choice 
theory is to the nature of regulation what original sin doctrine is to 
the nature of humanity. The doctrine of original sin posits “the in-
nate depravity [or] corruption . . . in all individuals of the human 
race, held to be inherited from Adam in consequence of the Fall.”4 In 
contrast to actual sin (which is the evil that men do as a matter of 
individual volition—and so can consciously strive to avoid) original 
sin is inbred, the evil tendency inevitable in human nature and irre-
                                                                                                                  
 * Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. For sharing suggestions, and reservations, 
about this paper, I am grateful to Stephen Garvey, Richard Geiger, Todd Rakoff, Edward 
Rubin, Peter Strauss, and Steven Shiffrin. I am especially indebted to my colleague Jeffrey 
Rachlinski, who offered not only a wealth of information about environmental regulation 
but also a patient and perceptive sounding board. 
 1. C. LLOYD MORGAN,  ANIMAL LIFE AND INTELLIGENCE  174 (Boston, Ginn & Co. 
1891). 
 2. See MARIE-LOUISE VON FRANZ, CREATION MYTHS (rev. ed. 1994). 
 3. Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (2000). 
 4. 10 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 934 (2d ed. 1989).  
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deemable by mere human efforts. The theory of public choice posits 
the innate depravity or corruption in all regulatory programs. Regu-
lation is conceived in the selfish interests of narrowly focused inter-
est groups, born in the logrolling of legislative politics, and nurtured 
in the bosom of the third member of the iron triangle, captive agen-
cies. At best, it is theft (the resources of some are redistributed to the 
pockets of others), at worst, inefficient (the costs imposed on the 
many outweigh the benefits accruing to the few). 
 As creation myths go, this is a pretty unpleasant one. It has none 
of the soap-operatic intrigues of gods and titans on Mt. Olympus, the 
solemn majesty of Osiris descending into the underworld and rising 
again to rule the living and the dead, or the awful grandeur of man 
rejecting the garden of innocence for a world filled with the knowl-
edge of good and evil. Instead, it offers a bleak, even sordid, account 
of the institutions through which modern civic man attempts social 
progress. In an age that tends to be optimistic, if not hubristic, about 
the potential of human endeavor, what is the power of this dark, un-
lovely myth?  
 Professor Croley observes that public choice is “appealing in its 
parsimoniousness,”5 and here, I think, he has put his finger on the 
answer. Public choice theory epitomizes the intellectual austerity of 
Occam’s Razor: that is, the maxim that assumptions introduced to 
explain something must not be multiplied beyond necessity.6 The 
maxim is alternatively phrased as the Law of Parsimony, “which for-
bids, without necessity, the multiplication of entities, powers, princi-
ples, or causes.”7 Public choice offers a versatile and ambitious ex-
planatory system derived from one, simple proposition: human self-
interest. Citizens act to acquire the biggest piece of the collective re-
source pie at the lowest cost to themselves; legislators act to acquire 
reelection; bureaucrats act to acquire more power (bigger budget, 
wider authority, and so on) while in government and lucrative oppor-
tunities via the revolving door when they leave. A single postulated 
entity, rational man, motivated by a single postulated principle, in-
terest maximization, can explain the existence of the regulatory uni-
verse and account for the various regulatory failures that so occupy 
scholarly and popular attention. 
  Professor Croley’s paper, with its general critique of the various 
elements of the public choice account backed up by three specific 
regulatory case studies, raises serious questions about the descriptive 
power of this creation myth. I want to continue that critical inquiry 
in this Comment. But first, I’d like to focus a bit on the power of pub-
                                                                                                                  
 5. Croley, supra note 3, at 15. 
 6. See, e.g., 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 245 (2d ed. 1989). 
 7. SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Lecture XXXIX , in 1 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS & LOGIC 
532, 546 (New York, Sheldon & Co. 1876).  
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lic choice theory to serve a predictive function—that is, its capacity to 
serve the community of those who believe in administrative law by 
helping us identify structures and processes that will enhance the 
likelihood of good regulatory outcomes and diminish the probability 
of bad ones.8 
 On this point, I offer a proposition the breadth and brashness of 
which matches the unvaulted ambition of public choice theory itself: 
Taken at its word and applied with logical rigor, public choice theory 
is utterly useless to us. When its adherents evaluate the modern 
regulatory state they find themselves in very much the same di-
lemma as strict-textualist originalists: If they remain faithful to the 
premises they espouse, then the only acceptable remedial strategy is 
universal, radical deregulation.9 Indeed, public choice’s dilemma may 
be uniquely intractable because nothing in the strict-textualist origi-
nalist analysis calls into question the theoretical possibility of such 
deregulation. By contrast, public choice insights seem to predict an 
inverse relationship between the need for the political process to act 
and its capacity to do so: as the self-interested investment of interest 
groups, legislators, and bureaucrats in existing regulation increases, 
the ability of the democratic process to dismantle that regulation 
decreases. Hence, radical deregulation is apparently as impossible to 
achieve as it is essential. Moreover, even if radical deregulation is 
theoretically possible within the public choice account, however plau-
sible this solution may be for libertarian political theorists or Chi-
cago-school economists, it is out of bounds for the community of those 
who believe in administrative law. Even if we had the ability to dis-
mantle the entire national regulatory apparatus, we have neither the 
will nor the desire to do so. 
                                                                                                                  
 8. Professor Croley asked me, fairly enough, what I mean by “the community of 
those who believe in administrative law.” Broadly, I mean those who believe in what Jerry 
Mashaw calls “the modern, activist administrative state.” JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, 
CHAOS & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 24 (1997). More 
particularly, I mean those who believe: (1) that collective public action to solve (or at least 
manage) complex social problems is—or at least has the capacity to be —both legitimate 
and effective; and (2) that the task of administrative law is to help discover the legal do c-
trines, administrative and judicial processes, and regulatory structures and strategies that 
facilitate a practice of regulatory government perceived by citizens as just, appropriate, 
and efficacious. Clearly, the community of believers I have thus defined is idealistic. I sup-
pose a premise of my argument here is that idealism, while obviously incompatible with 
cynicism, is not the equivalent of naïveté. 
 9. “[T]he best and simplest way to avoid the rent-seeking problem is to avoid estab-
lishing the institutions that create rents, that is, the regulations and regulatory agencies 
that lead to rent-seeking.” DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 245 (1989); see also Ed-
ward L. Rubin, Public Choice in Practice and Theory, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1657, 1666 (1993) 
(book review) (“Th[e] underlying premise implies a basic pessimism or fatalism about any 
meliorist project for public governance.”). For the best illustration of this dilemma in the 
originalist literature, see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994). 
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 But what about the significant body of work by those who deploy 
public choice theory to suggest improvements to regulatory policy 
and institutions? Such proposals, I suggest, cheat. To phrase it less 
contentiously, these scholars invoke public choice principles selec-
tively and incompletely. Rarely, if ever, however, do they openly ac-
knowledge this heterodoxy.10 By characterizing it this way, I do not 
mean to dismiss the value of such scholarship. Indeed, one of the ear-
liest and most interesting examples is the work of my colleague, Jon 
Macey, on statutory interpretation. Professor Macey has urged courts 
to be mindful of the public-choice perils of legislating and to antidote 
its evils by employing an interpretive presumption of public interest-
edness.11 Unless the rent-seeking, interest-group payoff character of 
the legislation is blatant and unavoidable, judges should deliberately 
construe a regulatory statute so as to realize whatever pretense of 
public interestedness they can find within it. This is an ingenious 
and highly appealing proposal. It is also, within the canons of public 
choice theory, either heresy or intellectual irresponsibility. The pro-
posal proceeds on the premise that judges desire to pursue public-
regarding objectives and will do so once they are educated in how to 
recognize, and remediate, private deals masquerading as public pur-
poses. 12 Yet, the behavior of judges is subject to the rule of interest-
maximization in just the same way as the behavior of ordinary citi-
zens, legislators, or bureaucrats. To assume otherwise is as heretical, 
within the premises of public choice theory, as it would be, within the 
premises of original sin doctrine, to assume a purely human act of 
redemption.13 One might attempt to finesse this fundamental depar-
                                                                                                                  
 10. For a rare example, from the originalist literature, of a scholar candidly acknowl-
edging that pragmatism leads him to sacrifice purity of principle and propose a second-best 
solution, see Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative 
State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1994). 
 11. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statu-
tory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM . L. REV. 223 (1986). The theme is 
picked up and developed more extensively (with varying conclusions) in DANIEL A. FARBER 
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE  (1991), and MASHAW , supra note 8, at 50-105. 
 12. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1399-1400, 1405 (1996) (noting pub-
lic choice’s “somewhat Panglossian view of judges” as “public-oriented decisionmakers”). 
 13. Compare Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Execu-
tive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 60-65 (1995) (arguing that federal judges, like federal legislators, 
are “regionally and geographically biased” and therefore likely to “carry out their duties 
with state and local political preferences as their main concern”), with William M. Landes 
& Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. 
& ECON. 875, 885 (1975) (arguing that “the self-interest of independent judges is promoted 
by enforcing legislation according to its original tenor,” rather than “according to the ever-
shifting preferences of successive legislatures”); see also Richard A. Posner, What Do 
Judges & Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 1, 1, 40 (1993) (modeling the “judicial utility function” to offer an alternative to the 
“view of judges as Prometheans or saints” that “domesticates them for economic analysis”). 
See generally Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemak-
ing, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1314-22 (1999) (arguing that judicial review favors special inte r-
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ture from public choice premises by hypothesizing some set of indi-
vidual incentives and/or group dynamics that, through happy coinci-
dence, aligns the self-interest of the rational judge with rendering in-
terpretive decisions that further the public interest. However, if such 
a set of incentives and dynamics could be discovered, what is the 
point of introducing public-interest motivation into the analysis? At 
best, advocating a jurisprudence of public-regarding interpretation is 
superfluous (judges will simply do what they would do anyway—
pursue their self-interest); at worst, it violates Occam’s Razor by un-
necessarily multiplying behavioral postulates. 14 
 In the end, the very characteristic of public choice theory that 
generates its intellectual power—that is, its parsimoniousness—
destroys its utility to those who would improve regulation. The first 
principle of self-interested motivation is universal and inexorable. No 
one can be trusted to transcend it, whether for the purpose of con-
structing, or of operating, public-regarding institutions—no one, not 
even legal academics and other scholars, for of course it is unpardon-
ably egotistical to proceed as if our behavior were a neutral search 
for truth motivated by benevolent disinterestedness. This would be 
the sort of logical error fallen into by those who unmindfully sport 
bumper stickers peremptorily commanding, “Question Authority!” 
Perhaps we don’t have to admit membership in the Borkian school of 
academic purpose (that is, scholars are free to propound theories 
they would not act on because, in academic exercises, no one gets 
hurt).15 But the powerful caustic of public choice theory should dis-
solve any illusions that the product of the scholarly process is any 
more immune from the effects of self-interested behavior than the 
product of the legislative, administrative, or judicial process. So pub-
                                                                                                                  
ests at the expense of the public interest); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory 
Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991) (same). 
 14. The otherwise perplexing approbation the judiciary tends to receive in law-and-
economics scholarship may be explained by the latter’s normative preference for the mar-
ket. Given the self-interest-maximizing Hobbesian man at the center of this world-view, 
public choice theory cannot be antilaw. Some regime of public order is required to minimize 
what Geoffrey Miller describes as the “costs of private expropriation, domination, and 
strife.” Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory, SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y, Spring 1991, at 196, 215. More particularly, the judiciary plays a pivotal role, in 
even the night watchman state, because “public enforcement of private agreements is re-
quired for the smooth operation of the market.” Rubin, supra note 12, at 1405. Hence, my 
earlier assertion that “radical deregulation” is the inevitable prescription of orthodox pub-
lic choice theory might justly be challenged for uncritically accepting the premise of law-
and-economics scholarship that dismantling the administrative regulation imposed by 
statute would return us to the “natural” (i.e., unregulated) state of the market. More prop-
erly, I ought to have described orthodox public choice’s remedial prescription as a return to 
the 19th century regulatory scheme in which a particular set of property and contract 
rights was established and protected by the common law. I am grateful to Todd Rakoff for 
reminding me of this. 
 15. 1 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 129, 130-31, 
464-65 (1987) (testimony of Robert H. Bork). 
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lic choice theory requires us to ask about the likely characteristics of 
the work produced by rational, interest-maximizing actors competing 
for the most desirable positions at the most prestigious academic in-
stitutions. Once again, I will credit Jon Macey with an interesting 
and helpful observation: American academia, in palpable contrast to 
European academic institutions, rewards risk-taking. Highly re-
garded scholarship in Europe tends to be intellectually conservative, 
prudently building by small, carefully-tested increments on the me-
ticulously elucidated foundation of what has come before. By con-
trast, in intellectual performance—as in other aspects of our cul-
ture—Americans value entrepreneurial boldness. Our approach is 
summed up crudely, but with a fair degree of accuracy, in the famil-
iar tag that there are two kinds of articles: those that are boring and 
right, and those that are interesting and wrong. The recent trend to-
wards ranking scholarly contribution according to frequency of cita-
tion reflects, and further entrenches, this conception of value by re-
warding the controversial and aggressive argument that provokes 
widespread reference and response. 
 And so I come back to my starting proposition: Taken at its word 
and applied with logical rigor, public choice theory is useless to those 
seeking guidance for improving regulatory government. No category 
of public or private actor can be trusted to transcend self-interest in 
order to pursue the responsible and care-taking use of public power. 
Indeed, in our self-appointed role as students and evaluators of ad-
ministrative law and institutions, we scholars cannot even trust our-
selves. 16  
                                                                                                                  
 16. At first blush, my thesis sits uneasily with a provocative article by David B. 
Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO L.J. 97 
(2000). Positing that “[v]oters want government to do what they would have done if they 
had the time and resources to devote to the problem,” Professors Spence and Cross con-
struct an ingenious model, involving information and value variables, to demonstrate why 
rational voters could regard agencies as more likely than elected officials, or the judiciary, 
to make policy choices that would mirror their own ideal (i.e., fully informed) preferences. 
Id. at 106. 
 The authors situate their work squarely within the public choice tradition. At the same 
time, however, they candidly acknowledge a desire to establish the democratic legitimacy 
of the administrative state, and they comfortably observe that their analysis complements 
the civic-republican case for administrative agencies. See id. at 97-101; see also Mark Sei-
denfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1511 (1992). These are not the typical aims or fellow travelers of public choice scholars. But 
cf. Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment—Explanations 
for Environmental Laws, 1969-73; 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 29, 32 n.8 (1998) (ques-
tioning “the sharp dichotomy that is often drawn between” rational choice and republican 
theories). The unusual catholicity of the Spence-Cross theory is possible, I believe, because 
it uses a particularly supple conception of rational man. The authors describe their ap-
proach as “characterized by methodological individualism, the assumption that individuals 
are goal maximizers, and deductive logic.” Spence & Cross, supra, at 100. Significantly, the 
analysis does not depend on assumptions about which goals the individual seeks to maxi-
mize. Even the crucial premise that “[v]oters want government to do what they would have 
done if they had the time and resources to devote to the problem,” id. at 106, does not in-
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 Unless we are prepared to understand ourselves as trapped in a 
regulatory universe that can be neither improved nor dismantled be-
cause of embedded self-interest, the only rational course is to have 
faith in the possibility of disinterested critique and hope in the capac-
ity of human actors to develop and implement regulatory practices 
that serve public, rather than private, ends—in other words, to follow 
the course of Jon Macey and others and invoke public choice princi-
ples only selectively and incompletely. I’ll call this approach (with 
apologies to Martin Flaherty 17) “public choice lite.”18 This is what is 
happening when, as Professor Croley chronicles, scholars invoke pub-
lic choice principles while conceding that individual citizens may en-
gage in collective political activity out of a sense of fairness, for ideo-
logical reasons, or to show solidarity;19 that legislators may be driven 
by ideology;20 that administrators may be motivated by ideology or 
their own sense of what constitutes the public good;21 and that some 
forms of regulation may be relatively more immune to rent-seeking 
than others.22 But in offering a justification for this resort to a species 
                                                                                                                  
sist that voters would pursue their own self-interest, rather than some more altruistic or 
ideological conception of the common good. See Schroeder, supra, at 39 (describing such 
motivation-independent use of rational choice theory as “thin-rationality”). 
 In other words, the Spence-Cross analysis makes a case for the rationality of citizens in a 
democracy choosing administrative agencies to be their policymaking agents, whatever 
goals they desire to maximize. See generally note 93 infra, and accompanying text (noting 
that some components of positive political theory can be employed regardless of particular 
assumptions about motivation); Schroeder, supra, at 36-37 (same). Indeed, the authors ex-
plicitly take no position on the “considerable normative public choice literature, which ar-
gues that government regulation is ineffective or counterproductive or both,” Spence & 
Cross supra, at 135, insisting that “[i]f [the normative literature] is accurate, [the position] 
needs to be presented in a straightforward manner that would stop Congress from passing 
regulatory statutes, rather than through the backdoor of nondelegation doctrine.” Id. 
Hence, they do not squarely contest the claim, advanced for example in Peter H. Aranson 
et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982), that broad regula-
tory delegations are undesirable because the ability to delegate increases the amount of 
legislation in a world in which virtually all legislation is designed to produce private goods 
at public expense. 
 Although I haven’t the temerity to suggest that Professors Spence and Cross aren’t really 
doing public choice analysis, their favorable assessment of regulatory delegation seems 
linked to the fact that their conception of “rationality” is far more congenial to what admin-
istrative law scholars mean by the term than is the conception typically employed in the 
public choice literature. As Peter Strauss has reminded me, a “rational” action in our world 
is one that sensibly implements the stated (or reasonably inferred) objectives of the organic 
statute; an action taken to further the self-interest of the agency or its employees would (if 
detected as such) promptly be rejected as irrational, an arbitrary and capricious misuse of 
power. 
 17. See Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM . L. REV. 523 (1995). 
 18. Compare Ed Rubin’s distinction between the “optimistic” and “pessimistic 
strand[s]” of public choice literature, Rubin, supra note 9, at 1659 n.6. 
 19. See Croley, supra note 3, at 21. 
 20. See id. at 22 & n.45. 
 21. See id. at 23. 
 22. See id. at 48. 
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of second-best reasoning—in which public choice principles play a 
significant but not exclusive role—haven’t I now contradicted my ini-
tial proposition that public choice theory is utterly useless to those 
who believe in administrative law? I think not, for two, related rea-
sons. 
 This first is theoretical. The structural integrity of public choice 
hinges on self-interest being the universal motivator. Within its un-
derstanding of human behavior, to say that some people act out of a 
rational conception of self-interest some of the time is as incongruous 
as saying, within our understanding of human reproduction, that a 
woman is a little bit pregnant. If we are going to be theoretically rig-
orous, we have to insist that one cannot really do just a little bit of 
public choice. As Occam’s Razor warns, once the possibility of a more 
complex palette of human motivation is introduced, the power of the 
theory sharply declines, for unless public choice lite can specify when 
self-interest will trump ideology (or a sense of fairness, or profes-
sional socialization, or whatever other motive) it will prove of little 
use either descriptively or prescriptively.23 And if it were to propose a 
coherent theory of human behavior that ascribes a role to motives 
other than self-interest maximization, it will no longer be public 
choice theory.24 
 Now at this point you may object that I have descended into the 
academic gamesmanship of logic-chopping and rhetorical nitpicking. 
Surely I am not suggesting that the community of those who believe 
in administrative law can, or should, ignore the dynamics of self-
interested individual and group behavior. Public choice theory sys-
tematically focused our attention on these dynamics, giving them 
names and modeling their operation. Is it not unreasonably rigid, 
even unfair, to suggest that administrative law scavenge what we 
can use from public choice and then junk it in favor of some new ac-
count that builds on the old while purportedly repudiating it? 
 This brings me to my second reason for challenging the utility of 
public choice theory to the community of those who believe in admin-
istrative law. This reason is rooted in observed practice, although it 
relates to my first, theoretical, reason. 
 Public choice theorists have brilliantly exploited the power of par-
simony. Trading aggressively on the intellectual austerity of their 
theory in its pure, undiluted form, they have not only asserted he-
gemony over the legal landscape—any substantive area can be suc-
                                                                                                                  
 23. For analogous criticism of civic republican theory, see Croley, supra note 3, at 25-
26. 
 24. “As a grand theory, public choice contains no principle that can control its own 
major premise. Its univalent version of human behavior, faced with no opposing force, 
roars onward to its ultimate, extreme result.” Rubin, supra note 9, at 1669; cf. GEORGE J. 
STIGLER, THE CITIZEN & THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 137 (1975) (“There is, in fact, 
only one general theory of human behavior, and that is the utility-maximizing theory.”). 
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cessfully analyzed, explained, and critiqued using public choice25—
but they have also, in a variety of subtle ways, succeeded in achiev-
ing hegemony. Consider the principal paper we are discussing here. 
Professor Croley begins by conceding that “confidence in public regu-
latory institutions—the modern administrative state—risks dis-
missal as idealistic and uninformed.”26 He proceeds quite cautiously 
in suggesting that the three regulatory initiatives he examines may 
indeed be as public regarding in substance as they appear. And hav-
ing offered a careful critique of the various elements of the public 
choice account, an unusually detailed case study of each of the three 
initiatives, and a thoughtful set of hypotheses for what might ac-
count for the outcomes, he still hastens to disarm criticism by admit-
ting that all this might sound naive.27 In the fifteen years since 
James Buchanan won the Nobel Prize,28 public choice theory has 
shifted the burden of proof. Anyone who seriously suggests that regu-
latory policy and institutions are designed or operated to serve the 
public interest is presumptively either too intellectually unsophisti-
cated to appreciate the temerity of his claim, or too gullible to ferret 
out the private interests behind the public-regarding facade. Nowa-
days, prudent administrative law scholars always spill a little wine 
to honor the public choice gods: deploring the inevitability of interest 
group dominance; reciting the formulaic account of venal legislators 
(particularly in oversight committees); and praising the virtues of 
faction-control. No wonder Professor Croley is nervous. 
 We have succumbed to the appeal of parsimoniousness while al-
lowing public choice scholars to violate the rule of parsimony. Stated 
somewhat differently, by failing to hold public choice theory rigor-
ously to the logic of its premises, we have lost the skeptical edge with 
which we would otherwise approach a claim that the extraordinary 
complexity of the regulatory state can be usefully understood 
through a story with such a simple template of human behavior. In 
saying we have lost the skeptical edge, I have in mind three specific 
sorts of errors that we tend to make, or tolerate others making, in the 
contemporary intellectual pressure to be “PC.” And at this point, I 
want to speak to the descriptive power, as well as the prescriptive 
utility, of the public choice account of regulation. 
  
                                                                                                                  
 25. Ed Rubin aptly describes public choice as “as grand a theory as one is likely to 
find in the deeply divided and self-doubting world of modern legal scholarship.” Rubin, su-
pra note 9, at 1664. 
 26. Croley, supra note 3, at 7. 
 27. See id. at 24. 
 28. “For many people, [public choice theory] was a relatively obscure field until 1986, 
when James Buchanan was aw arded the Nobel Prize in economics . . . .” FARBER & 
FRICKEY, supra note 11, at 1. 
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 1. Conflating Fallibility and Corruption.—First, we too readily 
allow bad policy to be equated with bad motives. A lack of ability, or 
competence, to perceive which regulatory policy best serves the pub-
lic interest must be sorted out from a desire to feather one’s own nest 
at the public expense. At least, it must be sorted out if we are inter-
ested in understanding and remedying regulatory failure rather than 
simply racking up another “I told you so” on the public choice hit list 
of regulatory disasters. Let me give you a very homely personal ex-
ample, and then link it to a more national one. 
 When my husband and I found ourselves with the unexpected 
good fortune of adopting two very young infants, we faced a difficult 
moral dilemma: Could we responsibly use disposable diapers or 
should we, as progressives with a self-declared concern about the en-
vironment, use a diaper service? Disposables were undoubtedly ap-
pealing—no diaper pails filled with sodden, smelly diapers awaiting 
pick-up—but they had a nasty reputation as a particularly notorious 
contributor to landfill problems, both because of their nondegradable, 
plastic-sheathed bulk and because of their contents (which include 
the E. Coli bacteria from which, given a leaky landfill access to 
ground water, epidemics are born). The prevailing “green” position on 
the issue was definitely anti-disposable. But it turned out that the 
case in favor of the diaper service was not so simple.29 The environ-
mental costs of transporting and laundering diapers depend on a 
number of variables including the frequency of, and distance traveled 
during, the trips made by a petroleum-consuming, air-polluting de-
livery truck; the temperature used in washing and drying, and the 
manner in which the water is heated; the type of detergent; the de-
gree and method of water recycling; and perhaps even the composi-
tion and quality of the diaper fabric.30 And then there were the 
harder to quantify health issues: Disposables credibly promise less 
diaper rash and other bacterially-caused infections and diseases, 
with a consequent decrease in the physical, economic, and emotional 
resources diverted to unhappy babies and doctors’ visits. I found 
analyses giving widely divergent estimates of the relative costs and 
                                                                                                                  
 29. See, e.g., Peter Passell, The Garbage Problem: It May Be Politics, Not Nature, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 26, 1991, at C1 (describing, inter alia, the contention of the National Associa-
tion of Diaper Services that disposables make up 2% of the nation’s garbage stream and 
the countering argument of a Procter & Gamble study that although disposables generate 
90 times as much solid waste as reusables, they consume three times less nonrenewable 
energy and generate 10 times less water pollutants). For a contemporary version of the 
case for disposables, see LYNN SCARLETT, A  CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
MYTHS & REALITIES (National Center for Pol’y Analysis, Reason Foundation Policy Report 
No. 165, 1991), http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s165/s165.html (last visited May 25, 2000). 
 30. Not surprisingly, many of the factors that correlate with higher environmental 
costs also correlate with “better” (i.e., more convenient and safer) diaper service from the 
perspective of parents: more frequent pickups, hotter laundry temperatures, less recycled 
water, and more effective detergents. 
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benefits of disposables and diaper services. None seemed to address 
every dimension relevant to the comparison. In the end I gave up. 
The information I had was too incomplete and too contingent; the 
variables were too many and too incommensurate. And so we used 
disposables. I have little doubt that, with hindsight, a persuasive 
case could be made that: (1) our decision in fact imposed a net social 
cost, and (2) it was perfectly predictable that we would place our self-
interest ahead of the broader public good. But this case would not ac-
curately describe what happened. 
 The national version of this story is curbside recycling. Some cal-
culations of the resources used to transport and process the array of 
recyclables now collected curbside in many communities conclude 
that common recycling practices are not only significantly more 
costly than waste disposal, but in fact represent a net environmental 
loss for many categories of material. 31 One wants to ask a lot of ques-
tions about those calculations, but let’s assume that they are both ac-
curate and exhaustive. The public choice explanation for how we 
would find ourselves saving, sorting, and hauling out, at weekly or 
biweekly intervals, unwieldy containers of newspaper, cardboard, 
paper, bottles, and cans in order to make the environment worse 
rather than better is obvious: Recycling is yet another instance of 
discrete interest groups (that is, scrap haulers and professional envi-
ronmentalists) manipulating the political process to accomplish a so-
cially nonoptimal, but privately lucrative, government regulatory ini-
tiative.32 But that’s not how it happened—or, at least, it is such a 
radically reductionary account as to be more misleading than accu-
rate. In my community and in communities around the nation, regu-
lar curbside recycling has been implemented, and expanded, because 
of a belief by private individuals and groups, and some public offi-
cials, that it is an environmentally sounder practice than putting all 
domestic trash in a landfill or incinerator.33 
                                                                                                                  
 31. See, e.g., John Tierney, Recycling is Garbage, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1996, at 24; 
Scarlett, supra note 29. For a more balanced examination, in that it notes the several com-
ponents and uncertainties in the recycling cost-benefit ledger in general, and for glass and 
different varieties of paper in particular, see Harvey Black, Rethinking Recycling, 103 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERS. 1006 (1995), http://www.heartland.org/earthday96/recyclin.htm (last 
visited May 25, 2000). 
 32. Tierney has observed: 
The leaders of the recycling movement derive psychic and financial rewards 
from recycling. Environmental groups raise money and attract new members 
through their campaigns to outlaw “waste” and prevent landfills from opening. 
They get financing from public and private sources (including the recycling in-
dustry) to research and promote recycling. By turning garbage into a political 
issue, environmentalists have created jobs for themselves as lawyers, lobbyists, 
researchers, educators, and moral guardians. 
Tierney, supra note 31, at 12. 
 33. See, e.g., Black, supra note 31. 
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 This belief about socially desirable environmental policy might in-
deed be wrong. To some extent, it might be “reasonably” wrong: In an 
increasingly complex and interdependent society, it is extraordinarily 
difficult to discern, in advance, the full ramifications of a shift in 
public behavior and to capture those ramifications in reliable cost-
benefit analysis. Introducing even a small change into a chaotic sys-
tem often does not produce the effect one would reasonably have ex-
pected. When this difficulty complicates even such “simple” choices 
as disposable diapers versus a diaper service, or paper versus plastic 
bags at the grocery store,34 or paper or ceramic versus foam coffee 
cups in the faculty lounge,35 how could we possibly expect omnis-
cience in such obviously multivariate problems as the appropriate 
regulation of toxic but useful substances36 and the best strategies for 
overcoming dependence on fossil fuels. 37 To the extent that making 
the wrong regulatory choice reflects the virtual impossibility of ex-
haustive and accurate advance calculation of regulatory effects, the 
message to be learned by the community of those who believe in ad-
ministrative law is two-fold. First, we should work towards reconcep-
tualizing regulatory programs—in the political, as well as the schol-
arly, arena—as explicitly and unapologetically works-in-progress, 
rather than as “done deal” solutions that merely require implementa-
tion. In other words, we ought to admit, from the outset, that regula-
tion is a process of learning and adapting, in which getting it exactly 
right the first time is an aspiration rather than a promise. Second, 
consistent with this reframing, we should routinely build into regula-
tory schemes the resources for systematic data collection and analy-
sis, as well as incentives for undefensive practices of periodic policy 
reevaluation. Of course, to some extent, mistakes about optimal regu-
                                                                                                                  
 34. For the argument that plastic grocery bags are in fact more environmentally re-
sponsible than paper, see Scarlett, supra note 29, at 10. See also Tierney, supra note 31, at 
5 (citing research that 12 plastic grocery bags fit in the landfill space occupied by one paper 
bag, which in fact does not degrade when buried in an airless landfill). 
 35. See Tierney, supra note 31, at 10 (citing research that a ceramic mug would have 
to be used 1000 times before its energy-consumption-per-use would equal that of a foam 
cup); see also Passell, supra note 29 (citing research that manufacturing a paper cup con-
sumes 36 times as much energy and generates 580 times as much waste water as the 
manufacture of a foam cup). 
 36. See, e.g., Robert A. Frosch, The Industrial Ecology of the 21st Century, SCI. AM., 
Sept. 1995, at 178, 180-81. (describing how zinc from automobile manufacturing wastewa-
ter was reclaimed by smelting until designation of zinc as a hazardous substance resulted 
in such stiff regulatory requirements that this material is now landfilled). 
 37. Some policy analysts have suggested that our efforts in this area are counter-
productive. See, e.g., ROBERT J. BRADLEY, JR., RENEWABLE ENERGY:  NOT CHEAP, NOT 
“GREEN” (Cato Inst. Pol’y Analysis No. 280, 1997), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-
280es.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2000) (analyzing the debate over the use of fossil fuels); 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS, BRIEF ANALYSIS NO. 238: THE GLOBAL WARMING 
TREATY: FOR U.S. CONSUMERS—ALL PAIN,  NO GAIN, http://www.ncpa.org/ba/ba238.html 
(last modified Aug. 20, 1997) (studying the impact of the Global Warming Treaty on U.S. 
citizens). 
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latory policy will be “unreasonable,” at least in the sense that they 
were predictable. Perhaps, for example, in pushing to expand recy-
cling from metal and paper to an ever-wider array of plastics, those 
concerned about the environment have fallen victim to a cascade ef-
fect.38 To that extent, the message to be learned involves the impor-
tance of identifying paradigms of expectable errors (such as cognitive 
biases) and developing particularized strategies for recognizing their 
presence and at least offsetting, if not preventing, them.39 
 In a strange perversion of Enlightenment rational humanism, 
public choice has made us more comfortable attributing the course of 
human events to human greed than to human fallibility. Consider 
one of the stories that has become legend in the public choice account 
of regulation, the new-source-performance-standards provision of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. The part of the story we remem-
ber, and regularly retell, is that, through a series of backroom legis-
lative-history manipulations, congressmen from West Virginia and 
other Eastern coal states ruthlessly protected the jobs of their high-
sulphur-coal mining constituency at the expense of the national 
benefits of switching to cleaner Western coal. 40 The part of the story 
that tends to get lost is that the Sierra Club, the National Resources 
Defense Council, the National Clean Air Coalition, the Center for 
Environmental Policy, and the Navaho Nation were on the same side 
of the issue as the dirty-coal industry.41 Their reasons included the 
following: concern that an alternative regulatory strategy would 
permit degradation of cleaner-than-required Western air;42 fears 
                                                                                                                  
 38. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999) (“An availability cascade is a self-reinforcing process of collec-
tive belief formation by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that gives 
the perception increasing plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse.”). 
 39. My colleague, Jeffrey Rachlinski, who has worked on such problems in the private 
law context, describes this as the challenge of discovering optimal institutional design in 
the face of cognitive biases. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of 
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998). Cass Sunstein has been working on 
such questions in the public law context. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-
Benefit Analysis (U. of Chi. Law School, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper 
No. 85, Sept. 1999), http://papers.ssrn.com (last visited May 25, 2000); Kuran & Sunstein, 
supra note 38; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Deci-
sions (U. of Chi. Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 01) (forthcom-
ing 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com (last visited May 25, 2000). 
 40. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY 
AIR (1981). 
 41. See id. at 21-22, 28-29, 36, 46. Indeed, Ackerman and Hassler’s introduction 
makes clear their view that error, rather than corruption, was the primary reason that (as 
they put it in the alternate title) “[t]he Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-
Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers.” Id. at 2 (criticizing the regulatory program as both 
unnecessarily expensive and “so inept” that air quality will actually decline in some areas, 
but describing “Congress’s well-intentioned effort” and characterizing “the people who 
shaped the 1979 decision” as “remarkable for their high intelligence and conscientious-
ness”). 
 42. See id. at 21-24, 28-29. 
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about the environmental costs of strip-mining and transporting 
Western coal; 43 and worries that the utility industry planned to sub-
vert sulphur standards by simply raising the height of smokestacks. 44 
Let us assume that these groups were indeed mistaken in their envi-
ronmental calculus. The mere fact of their (erroneous) presence on 
the “wrong” side of the issue significantly complicates any genuine ef-
fort to understand why this regulatory policy initiative went astray. 
Ackerman and Hassler’s account of the legal and political history of 
the 1977 amendments gives the environmentalists a crucial role in 
shaping the reactions of both Congress and the White House.45 At a 
minimum, their signaling power—that is, their capacity, merely by 
announcing a position on an issue, to affect how the issue is per-
ceived by other actors—was deliberately exploited by dirty-coal advo-
cates. 46 How far would Eastern coal interests have succeeded in per-
verting federal clean air policy if some of the country’s most re-
spected environmental organizations had gotten the environmental 
calculus right and weighed in on the opposite side? 
 Professor Croley reminds us of the political science cliche “that 
there are essentially but two theories of government, the corruption 
theory and the incompetence theory.”47 From the perspective of the 
public getting bad environmental policy, maybe it doesn’t make a dif-
ference whether the cause is deliberate selfishness, good-faith falli-
bility, or some unfortunate synergy of the two. From the perspective 
of those with a strong ideological commitment to minimal govern-
ment interference with the market, it certainly doesn’t make a differ-
ence whether regulatory mistakes are attributable to knaves or fools. 
However, from the perspective of the community of those who believe 
in administrative law, and who seek to understand regulatory his-
tory in order to avoid the curse of repeating it, such distinctions 
make all the difference in the world. 
 
                                                                                                                  
 43. See id. at 78 n.*. 
 44. See id. at 21-24. 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 27-32, 43-46, 59. In fact, in their account, environmental concerns 
were the original driving force of mandating scrubber technology:  
The House subcommittee had originally turned to scrubbing as an ancillary en-
vironmentalist measure in support of [preventing the significant deterioration 
of clean air regions] and viewed the coal lobby as a convenient ally in the battle 
for clean air. But once the attention of the coal lobby had been engaged, the 
scrubbing issue took on a life of its own in the service of regional protectionism. 
Id. at 31-32. 
 46. See id. at 46 (quoting the Congressional Record in which Senator Metzenbaum, for 
the Eastern coal interests, cites the support of the Sierra Club, etc., to allay his colleagues’ 
expressed concerns about environmental impact); see also id. at 44 (“The environmental 
lobby had proved a congressional power, and [Carter Administration support for] scrubbing 
was an easy way of converting a dangerous opponent [to the Administration’s comprehen-
sive energy plan] into a formidable ally.”). 
 47. Croley, supra note 3, at 106. 
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 2. Confusing Causation and Opportunism.—The second sort of 
error is similar to the first, and so I will treat it briefly. We fail to in-
sist on a careful distinction between initiating cause and opportunis-
tic response. A good example is CERCLA.48 The Superfund program 
is a highly significant regulatory initiative that seems, on its face, 
difficult for public choice to explain. It imposes enormous concen-
trated costs on identifiable interests—producers of hazardous waste, 
landfill owners, and disposal companies—in order to produce diffuse 
environmental and health benefits. Under public choice premises, 
such legislation is impossible to enact. 49 Hence, there must be some-
thing else going on. The “something else” is discovered to be the 
enormous concentrated benefits that the massively expensive site 
cleanup process confers on engineering consultants, analytical test-
ing laboratories, environmental lawyers, and hazardous waste con-
struction contractors. 50 One might be hard pressed to deny that these 
groups play a powerful role in current political debates about the 
program. But, except for the lawyers, these groups did not exist in 
anything like their current form twenty years ago when CERCLA 
was enacted. As for the lawyers, it would have taken a mind with 
truly demonic cunning to scheme to extract rents by constructing a 
                                                                                                                  
 48. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) of 1980 § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 9612 (1999). 
 49. Stigler notes: 
It is of course true that the theory would be contradicted if, for a given regula-
tory policy, we found the group with larger benefits and lower costs of political 
action being dominated by another group with lesser benefits and higher cost of 
political action. Temporary accidents aside, such cases simply will not arise: 
our extensive experience with the general theory in economics gives us the con-
fidence that this is so. 
STIGLER, supra note 24, at 140.  
 Several scholars have observed that the passage of federal environmental legislation, as 
a general matter, poses grave explanatory difficulties for public choice theory. See, e.g., 
Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59 
(1992); Richard Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A 
Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 542 (1997); Peter H. Schuck, Against (And For) 
Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 553, 566 (1997). See also 
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS & GOVERNANCE 33 (1997). But see Schroeder, supra 
note 16. 
 50. Critics’ estimates of lawyers’ and consultants’ costs range from 35%-88% of the to-
tal dollars expended on Superfund sites. See, e.g., NATIONAL CENTER FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS, 
SUPER FUND FOR LAWYERS , http://www.ncpa.org/ea/eaja92a.html (last visited June 14, 
2000); NATIONAL CENTER FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS, No Cleanup in Site for Costly Superfund 
Mess, in NCPA POL’Y DIG., MAR. 24, 1997, http://www.ncpa.org/pd/weekly/pd32497.html 
(last visited June 14, 2000); Gregg Easterbrook, Beyond Politics as Usual, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 9, 1995 at W20; H. Sterling Burnett, The 104th Congress’s Environmental Record: 
What Was Accomplished and What Remains, http://www.ncpa.org/oped/sterling/record. 
html (last visited June 14, 2000). Cf. Lloyd S. Dixon, The Transaction Costs Generated by 
Superfund’s Liability Approach in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE , AND LAW 
171, 184 (R. Revesz & R. Stewart, eds. 1995) (analyzing several RAND studies and con-
cluding that “Superfund transaction-cost shares appear to fall in the range observed for 
common types of tort litigation”). 
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statute that closes off many of the most common avenues of regula-
tory litigation and decreases parties’ incentives to use the ones that 
remain.51  
 To understand the operation of the food chain on the African 
plains you have to distinguish between predators and scavengers; to 
understand the birth and evolution of a regulatory program, you 
have to distinguish between initiating causes and adaptive entrepre-
neurial behavior. Of course those concerned about Superfund policy-
making must take account of the cadre of environmental profession-
als who now have a high stake in maintaining and extending the 
cleanup ambitions of the statute. African park management has to 
take account of the hyenas as well as the lions. But the signs of an 
impending problem and the appropriate responsive strategies are 
likely to be very different. Perhaps more accurately, the responsive 
strategy is likely to be different so long as the objective is making a 
complex system work, rather than dismantling it. Presumably, Afri-
can park management would not need to distinguish lions from hye-
nas if it were prepared to respond by destroying the zebra population 
upon which both feed. If one starts from the ideological presumption 
that the only good regulation is no regulation, one has no need to sort 
out regulatory programs that are born in rent-seeking from those 
whose original public-regarding nature is perverted over time. If I 
may switch metaphors in mid-stream, from that perspective the 
Darth Vaders of the Evil Empire cause as much mischief as the 
Darth Mauls.52 But, for the community of those who believe in ad-
                                                                                                                  
 51. As originally enacted, CERCLA blocks preenforcement challenges to the EPA’s 
cleanup orders. See CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1999). In other words, the 
agency can issue unilateral orders specifying how the costly site cleanup process is to oc-
cur, and these orders are not judicially reviewable until the work has been completed. See 
id. Failure to comply with such an order permits the EPA to undertake the work itself and 
then charge the resulting costs to the potentially responsible parties (PRPs). See CERCLA 
§ 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1999). This is an extremely risky option for PRPs because they 
lose all ability to control cleanup costs during the process and, if their failure to comply 
with the order is ultimately found to be without “due cause,” they become liable not only 
for what the EPA spent but also for severe penalties. Because the statute imposes strict li-
ability, jointly and severally, on those who generate, handle, or store hazardous wastes, the 
range of possible legal defenses to compliance with a cleanup order is quite limited. See 
generally Cross, supra note 13, at 1315-18 (arguing that special interest groups consis-
tently favor broad and readily triggered judicial review of agency action). 
 CERCLA became lucrative for environmental lawyers not because of litigation, but be-
cause of their role in the long-lived and intensely active PRP groups that undertake the 
cleanups, and hence squabble among themselves about allocating the resulting costs. Be-
cause the issues here tend to be technical and financial, one might reasonably have ex-
pected engineers and financial officers to play the primary role in these negotiation and 
monitoring activities. That lawyers emerged as the principal representatives of PRPs even 
on these largely nonlegal matters is an example of opportunistic response. 
 52. For those readers unfamiliar with the Star Wars saga, some explanation is in or-
der. Darth Vader was once a virtuous Jedi Knight who was corrupted by the “dark side” to 
become the evil empire’s chief agent. In contrast, Darth Maul appears to have been evil 
from the moment of creation. 
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ministrative law, it is essential to learn whether, and how, a good 
program was turned to the dark side of private gain, for in that 
knowledge lies the hope of redemption. 
 
 3. Grasping Simplistic Solutions in a Complex World.—These 
first two sorts of errors arise from a common cause: Because public 
choice theory, rigorously applied, leads ineluctably to the policy pre-
scription of radical deregulation, its orthodox practitioners have little 
incentive, when examining particular regulatory programs, to tease 
out complex strands of causation or to chart the critical stages in a 
program’s evolution. Discovering that self-interest has operated in 
some significant way at some point in the course of a suboptimal 
regulatory program is enough to prove that government intervention 
cannot be trusted to maximize social welfare. By contrast, when the 
community of those who believe in administrative law turns to public 
choice principles, we do so with the objective of improving, rather 
than discrediting, regulatory government—and then public choice’s 
reductionary tendency simply to verify the operation of self-interest 
can obscure the discovery of other causes and the recognition of pro-
gram degradation over time. In other words, the tendencies to con-
flate fallibility with corruption, and to confuse causation with oppor-
tunism, are errors that we inherit from orthodox public choice, but 
they matter more to us given our objectives. 
 By contrast, the third sort of error is one we have created our-
selves because of our objectives. When we selectively and incom-
pletely invoke public choice principles in thinking about how to im-
prove regulatory government—that is, when we engage in public 
choice lite—we tend to swallow quite readily some very simplistic as-
sertions about political actors and institutions. Sometimes these as-
sertions are invoked merely to buttress policy proposals rooted in 
some other ideological position.53 More often, I think, their appeal lies 
in the genuine desire of those who believe in administrative law to 
find solutions for regulatory failure and in the comfort we take from 
discovering remedial strategies that even the cynical science of public 
choice seems to approve. 
 The clearest example of this sort of error is the emergence of the 
President, in much contemporary administrative law literature, as 
the white knight of public-regardingness. Enhanced presidential con-
trol over regulatory policymaking is advocated as the means through 
which the interests of the nation can triumph over the geographical 
parochialism and special-interest pandering that drive the rest of the 
                                                                                                                  
 53. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 13 (invoking public choice principles to demon-
strate the wisdom of the strong presidential control over regulation that is, assertedly, re-
quired by a textualist-originalist reading of the Constitution). 
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political process. 54 The vision of the President as the sole true voice 
and champion of the whole American people is at least as old as An-
drew Jackson, who insisted, “We are one people in the choice of 
President and Vice-President. . . . The people . . . are represented in 
the executive branch.”55 The migration of self-serving executive po-
litical rhetoric into scholarly good-government arguments has oc-
curred because the Jacksonian claim now appears provable by the 
application of public choice principles. We’ve all seen, and maybe 
even used, the following argument: The legislature is susceptible to 
the narrow, factional pressures of parochial concerns and special in-
terests because members of Congress must stand for frequent reelec-
tion by geographically discrete populations who vote, from rational 
self-interest, to reward those members most successful at bringing 
home the pork. By contrast, the President’s electoral constituency is 
the entire nation. When choosing their President, voters (perhaps) 
tend to identify their self-interest with the larger welfare of the coun-
try. But even if presidential voters retain their narrowly self-
interested focus on their own situation, the President has to satisfy a 
national electoral majority, and so the President has every incentive 
to support regulatory policy that maximizes aggregate social welfare 
and reject policy that extracts rents for the benefit of a small group. 
Hence, the incidence of regulatory failure will predictably be lowered 
by remedial strategies that broaden and deepen White House control 
over regulatory policymaking, particularly in opposition to Congres-
sional control. 
 The difficulty is that, even within public choice principles, this as-
sessment is flawed.56 Put aside questions about whether we get a suffi-
ciently rich description of the behavior of public officeholders by assum-
ing they always act to maximize their chance of election and reelection.57 
                                                                                                                  
 54. See, e.g., id.; Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Admini-
stration, 94 COLUM . L. REV. 1, 93-106 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Pra-
kash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). 
 55. ARTHUR BERNON TOURTELLOT, THE PRESIDENTS ON THE PRESIDENCY 35 (1964). 
Compare the more recent assertion by Wendy Gramm, during her tenure as Administrator 
of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA): “‘The job of the bureaucracy is 
to take care of special interests. The president, in contrast, is elected to represent the peo-
ple.’” NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUB. ADMIN., PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING 
IN REGULATORY AGENCIES 26 (1987). 
 56.  There has been remarkably little modeling of presidential behavior by rational 
choice theorists. “The hallmark of modern U.S. government is presidential leadership. Yet 
positive theorists have never known quite what to do with presidents. . . . [T]hey typically 
are left out—a datum so well known among positive theorists that they informally refer to 
presidents as ‘the P-word.’” Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of 
Structure, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at 1, 1-2. 
 57. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 11, at 33; DONALD P. GREEN & IAN 
SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE  47-71 (1994); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look 
at the Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 
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Put aside questions about why people vote,58 what voters desire from 
the holders of various public offices, 59 and how voters resolve the 
problem of issue bundling.60 Put aside questions about whether, even 
if the President himself is motivated to act as the champion of all the 
people, proposals to enhance “presidential” control over regulatory 
policymaking take sufficient account of behavioral incentives in all 
the little fiefdoms in the Executive Office of the President through 
which such control is actually implemented.61 All these questions 
                                                                                                                  
199, 217-23 (1988); Abner J. Mikva, Foreword to Symposium on Theory of Public Choice, 74 
VA. L. REV. 167 (1988). 
 58. Because no rational voter could assume that her vote will make a difference—at 
least in any but the most local elections—the act of voting per se poses a serious problem 
for rational choice theory. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 11, at 24-27; Jon Elster, In-
troduction to RATIONAL CHOICE  1, 24 (J. Elster ed. 1986); Douglass North, A Neoclassical 
Theory of the State, in RATIONAL CHOICE, supra, at 248.  
In their resolute determination to declare some variant of rational choice the-
ory victorious over the evidence . . . rational choice theorists have trotted out an 
astonishing variety of conjectures about the costs and benefits of voting, in the 
process generating an enormous literature, possibly larger in terms of academic 
citations and sheer bibliographic length than any other rational choice litera-
ture in American politics.  
GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 57, at 47-48. 
 59. Literature questioning the proposition that citizens desire, and reward at the bal-
lot box, politicians who pander to voters’ short-term, material, individual self-interest in-
cludes the following: David O. Sears et al., Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Atti-
tudes and Presidential Voting, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 670 (1980), and Donald R. Kinder & 
D. Roderick Kiewiet, Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal 
Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting, 23 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 495 (1979). See also GEORGE C. EDWARDS III & ALEC M. GALLUP, PRESIDENTIAL 
APPROVAL: A SOURCEBOOK 138 (1990) (citing literature). 
 60. Even if one assumes that the median voter typically engages in issue voting and 
that issue voting is a single phenomenon, cf. Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, 
The Two Faces of Issue Voting, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 78, 78 (1980) (distinguishing unso-
phisticated “easy issue” voting from the rarer sort of “hard issue” voting that entails “con-
scious calculation of policy benefits for alternative electoral choices”), candidates for na-
tional political office present voters with a limited choice among prepackaged, multi-
faceted policy platforms.  
In order to get the policy “sticks” they value most highly, voters have to take 
whatever other sticks come in the bundle. . . . The point is not that policy  
bundling is democratically illegitimate, but rather that it precludes any  
facile translation of election results into “the people’s will” on specific policy is-
sues . . . . 
Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex 
World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 998 (1997). 
 61. The Executive Office of the President employs more than 1500 persons and com-
prises the White House Office, the Office of the Vice President, the Council of Economic 
Advisers, the Council on Environmental Quality, the National Security Council, the Office 
of Administration, the Office of Management & Budget (containing, inter alia, the very 
significant Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs), the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy, the Office of Policy Development (comprising the Domestic Policy Council and the 
National Economic Council), the Office of Science & Technology Policy, and the Office of 
the United States Trade Representative. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 
2001, at ch. 10, 257-261 (2000), http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/pdf/spec.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2000). 
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aside, the rational candidate for election or reelection to the office of 
President knows perfectly well that he does not have to satisfy some 
hypothetical “national majority consensus.”62 Presidential politics can 
be conducted quite successfully with the support of considerably less 
than an electoral majority. Bill Clinton was elected in 1992 with 43% 
of the popular vote, a percentage that he shares with first-termer 
Richard Nixon and that exceeds the percentage achieved by first-
termer Woodrow Wilson and by Abraham Lincoln.63 Moreover, as the 
rational candidate knows, only about half of eligible voters typically 
cast presidential ballots. Bill Clinton won reelection in 1996 on the 
support of about 24% of the national electorate.64 In fact, the rational 
presidential candidate recognizes that he can achieve a “landslide” 
victory—with all the political payoff this characterization provides—
based on the electoral support of as few as 27% of eligible voters. 
That’s the percentage that gave Ronald Reagan his celebrated 1980 
victory which, because of its perception as a landslide, provided his 
legislative agenda with momentum that a Democratic Congress 
found hard to resist for at least a year after the election.65  
 Moreover, even before the 2000 election gave the rest of us a hard 
lesson in basic civics, the rational presidential candidate would fully 
appreciate the significance of the fact that the President is not 
elected by the voters of all the states (despite what popular and even 
legal literature suggests), but rather by the Electoral College. More 
precisely, he is elected by 270 votes of the Electoral College. The 
beauty of the Electoral College is that it allows him to identify the 
geographical areas of the country in which it is most rational for him 
                                                                                                                  
 Not surprisingly, these assorted units exhibit diverse patterns of political behavior. For 
example, one empirical study of contacts between interest groups and the Reagan Execu-
tive Office found that, while the Office of Public Liaison (within the White House Office) 
interacted frequently with a broad cross-section “of the interest group world,” a “significant 
majority” of the groups “interacting frequently” with the OMB were “trade associations 
and other organizations representing the profit sector of society” while “[c]itizens groups 
were hardly counted at all among the groups interacting frequently with the budget office.” 
Mark A. Peterson, The Presidency and Organized Interests: White House Patterns of Inter-
est Group Liaison, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 612, 621 (1992). 
 62. See generally Farina, supra note 60, at 993-1007. 
 63. Wilson had 42%, Lincoln, a mere 40%. See HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. 
NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 111-15 (4th ed. 1994). Presidents elected 
with between 45% and 50% of the popular vote include Buchanan, Garfield, Cleveland 
(twice), Wilson (1916), Truman, and Kennedy. See id. George W. Bush recently took his 
place on this list as well. 
 64. Clinton received about 49% of the votes cast; in turn, only about 49% of those eli-
gible to vote did so. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,  VOTER REGISTRATION AND 
TURNOUT—1996, http://www.fec.gov/pages/96to.htm (last visited May 25, 2000) (reporting 
that about 74% of those of voting age registered; about 66% of those registered voted). 
 65. See NELSON W. POLSBY & AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 176 (7th 
ed. 1988). As the next paragraph explains, the Electoral College system contributes signifi-
cantly to the landslide phenomenon. 
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to build support. 66 Victory can be had by obtaining the electoral votes 
of a mere eleven states. 67 Of course, it will be hard to tailor his behav-
ior perfectly to the preferences of the top eleven states, but some 
states carry such a heavy electoral vote payoff that the rational can-
didate must at least attempt to discover a cost-effective strategy that 
will win him the state.68 “Winning a state” is made easier by the fact 
that every state but two (which offer quite modest numbers of elec-
toral votes69) uses the winner-take-all system for allocating its elec-
toral votes. Hence, the rational candidate knows that he can win 
without obtaining a majority popular vote in all the states, or even in 
any of the states, within his electoral college package. To get the 
state’s entire electoral complement, he need only build a coalition 
that can deliver more popular votes than those delivered by the coali-
tion supporting his closest opponent.70 
 In sum, the rational candidate for election or reelection as Presi-
dent does not see his constituency as the broad melting pot of Ameri-
cans stretching from sea to shining sea. Rather, he sees a patchwork 
of potential interest coalitions, whose utility to him depends upon a 
combination of their geographical location and concentration, and 
their marginal value in assembling a plurality within the state. The 
decline of the major political parties as vehicles for reliably securing 
the long-term allegiance of large blocs of voters only enhances this 
perspective, for the national political entrepreneur needs now, more 
than ever, to be alert for opportunities to broker support from among 
                                                                                                                  
 66. To play the game of rational presidential candidate crafting a campaign strategy 
to maximize electoral college efficiency, go to the wonderful site, The U.S. Electoral College 
Calculator, at http://www.jump.net/~jnhtx/ec/ec.html (last visited May 25, 2000). 
 67. These states are as follows: California, New York, Texas, Florida, Pennsylvania, 
Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, and either Georgia or Virginia. 
 68. California, the El Dorado of the Electoral College, can deliver more votes (54) than 
the lowest 15 states combined. Not surprisingly, this translates into incentives for both 
candidates and “incumbent presidents with an eye on the next election” to give “dispropo r-
tionate weight” to voters in states like California. Steven J. Brams & Morton D. Davis, The 
3/2’s Rule in Presidential Campaigning, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 113, 133-34 (1974). One 
analysis concludes that, on a per capita basis, “voters in California are 2.92 times as at-
tractive campaign targets as voters in Washington D.C.,” while the state of California as a 
whole is “8.13 times as attractive per electoral vote as Alaska.” Id. at 134. Another calcu-
lates that “a citizen of California is over 20 times more likely to determine the outcome of a 
modern presidential election than is a citizen of Rhode Island. Even eliminating California 
and Rhode Island, we find ratios above 13 between the power of the most and least advan-
taged citizens.” George Rabinowitz & Stuart Elaine MacDonald, The Power of the States in 
U.S. Presidential Elections, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 65, 80 (1986). 
 69. Nebraska, five; and Maine, four. 
 70. This method of allocating electoral votes helps create “landslides.” Ronald 
Reagan’s 1980 victory rested on a bare majority (50.9%) of the popular vote, but he “won” 
all but five states in the Electoral College, for a resounding 489-49 vote victory over Mi-
chael Dukakis. See LYN RAGSDALE , VITAL STATISTICS ON THE PRESIDENCY tbl. 8-1, 370-72 
(1996); Robert A. Dahl, Myth of the Presidential Mandate, 105 POL. SCI. Q. 355, 355 (1990). 
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shifting coalitions. 71 Lynn Baker nicely articulated the question of 
presidential incentives to alienate a discrete interest group in order 
to secure diffuse, general benefits: If the President has the choice of 
signing an agricultural subsidy bill and proclaiming his commitment 
to protecting the future of American farmers, or of vetoing the legis-
lation and trumpeting his saving American consumers $1.50 on their 
grocery bills, what does rational self-interest counsel him to do?72 
 But wait a minute, you may be thinking, this critique is too sim-
plistic. What about the second-term President? His motives can’t be 
modeled as a single-minded determination to ensure electoral suc-
cess—or at least to ensure his own electoral success.73 And how does 
this picture of the President as national interest-group entrepreneur 
par excellence fit with Professor Croley’s three case studies in which 
the White House supported major regulatory initiatives that were 
deeply unpopular with powerful interest groups? My response would 
have to be: “Of course it’s too simplistic. But so is public choice lite’s 
rush to embrace the President as the defender of public-regarding 
regulation from the corruption of rent-seeking interest groups and 
their Congressional allies.”74  
                                                                                                                  
 71. See, e.g., Martin P. Wattenberg, From a Partisan to a Candidate-Centered Elec-
torate, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 139, 154-67 (Anthony King ed., 1990) (ob-
serving that coalition-building among interest groups has become increasingly important 
to presidential candidates as a result of the declining importance of parties, and describing 
the key role of Christian fundamentalists, upper-income voters, and white southerners to 
the Republican party in the 1980s); John C. Green & James L. Guth, Who Is Right and 
Who Is Left? Activist Coalitions in the Reagan Era, in DO ELECTIONS MATTER? 52-53 (B. 
Ginsburg & A. Stone eds., 1991) (noting the “large and diverse” groups in the Republican 
“activist base,” in which “n o one group dominates prospective coalitions,” such that the “se-
rious political and demographic differences” among these groups require adept political 
leadership “to maintain order among competing factions”). 
 72. Lynn Baker, Remarks at a Faculty Workshop at Cornell Law School (Feb. 11, 
2000). 
 73. Peter Strauss reminds me of the growing importance of the Vice President in the 
area of regulatory policy “coordination” and observes—in what would surely be relevant to 
a public-choice modeling of Executive behavior—that the Vice President is never a lame 
duck while he holds his office. 
 74. The deep appeal of the President as faction-proof champion of the people’s inter-
ests is evident in Professor Croley’s conclusion that one of his case studies shows “how the 
White House can foster agency independence from Congress in ways that allow an agency 
better to pursue general interests.” Croley, supra note 3, at 101. Without denying the po-
litical importance of the White House imprimatur, we might examine more closely whether 
these case studies indeed reveal the President functioning to shield agencies from an inte r-
est-group-driven legislature. 
 Most obviously, the President might protect public-regarding regulation from a hostile 
Congress through the veto power, which enables him to raise the level of legislative sup-
port that interest groups must purchase from 51% to 67% in each chamber. However, in 
none of the case studies did overruling legislation get far enough to generate even a mean-
ingful threat of veto. (Death by appropriations cutoff is a different problem, for which the 
veto is far less useful; but this legislative tactic did not eventuate in any case either. See 
infra note 78.) 
 Short of thwarting an actual statutory overruling, the President might make the course 
of public-regarding regulation considerably smoother for an agency. As leader of his party, 
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 In the end, the good guys are not as good as we hope—and the bad 
guys are not as bad as we fear. Take Congress, the institution of gov-
ernment about which no public choice theorist (orthodox or lite) 
seems to have anything good to say. Here, I’d like to suggest to Pro-
fessor Croley that even he, with his clear-eyed and well-argued skep-
ticism about public choice and its premises, has been induced to 
swallow a considerable amount more of the public choice line than is 
healthy. Do the stories of the ozone, tobacco, and banking reform 
rules indeed reveal, as he says, that “Congress was on the whole ex-
tremely critical of each agency’s efforts”?75 Or do these accounts show 
that Congress permitted each agency to go forward, after allowing its 
individual members the freedom to engage in some politically neces-
sary plumage display? At the end of the day, Congress did not act to 
block any of these regulatory initiatives. Bills targeting the new rules 
made virtually no headway through the normal legislative process. 76 
Even procedures designed to make it easier to control wayward agen-
cies, such as the fast-track Corrections Day process77 and the sixty-
day moratorium on new major rules,78 were not used to thwart the 
agencies here.79 Members of Congress were undoubtedly, genuinely, 
                                                                                                                  
he could invoke some combination of moral suasion and political discipline to curb the 
critical rhetoric of his own party members. This clearly would have been helpful to the 
agencies in at least the ozone and tobacco cases, but Clinton seems not to have managed it 
for either Carol Browner or David Kessler. See Croley, supra note 3, at 62-65 (describing 
the vocal opposition to the ozone rule by Democratic governors and mayors and congres-
sional moderates); see also id. at 71-72 (describing similar opposition to the tobacco rule by 
Democratic Members and governors and even the Senate Minority Leader). As head of 
White House policy-analysis operations, the President could dispatch witnesses to support 
the agency’s position in oversight hearings. Again, the case studies are not remarkable ex-
amples of this sort of protection. In particular, Browner was often left conspicuously on her 
own through difficult hearings. See id. at 64-65. And when the Administrator of OIRA fi-
nally did testify in her support, the revelation of White House internal division over the 
ozone policy gave additional fuel to her critics. See id. at 62-63, 65. 
 In sum, while the case studies persuasively suggest that presidential approval was in-
dispensable to the agency’s going forward—had the White House publicly condemned the 
proposal, the agency would almost surely have given up, or at least significantly curtailed 
its efforts—they are far less convincing support for the proposition that presidential pro-
tection helped these regulatory initiatives survive the legislative arena. 
 75. Croley, supra note 3, at 87. 
 76. Indeed, as Professor Croley notes, the only legislation actually enacted in the 
three case studies affirmed the agency’s regulatory initiative. See Croley supra note 3, at 
83-84 (describing the financial services reform legislation following the Office of Comptrol-
ler of Currency’s regulatory action). 
 77. See H.R. Res. 168, 106th Cong. (June 20, 1995) (now codified as House Rule 
XV(6)); WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., THE HOUSE’S CORRECTIONS 
CALENDAR (Report No. 97-301GOV, 1999), http://www.house.gov/rules/97-301.pdf (last 
modified Sept. 21, 1999). 
 78. See Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-121, tit. II, sec. 251, § 801(a)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 857, 868-69. 
 79. Even threats to use  the appropriations process to defund enforcement action—a 
politically far easier method of blocking politically unpopular agency policy than overt sub-
stantive amendment—remained only that, threats. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 3, at 92-93. 
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hostile; Congress the institution did not come to heel at the call of the 
powerful constituencies opposing these regulations. 
 We are accustomed to seeing proof, from Kenneth Arrow and oth-
ers, that the aggregate rational actions of rational individuals can 
produce irrationality. Sobered by game theory, we find it hard to 
imagine that the outcome of the political whole could ever be better 
than the sum of its parts. But it does, sometimes, seem to happen. 
The most dramatic examples are when Congress uses the Ulysses 
strategy: when it passes statutes like the Base Closing Act80 or the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, 81 in which it aims the ship of state at 
a public-interested goal and then ties itself to the mast to prevent di-
version. Note that in these instances, Congress (like the original 
Ulysses) does not attempt either to silence the voice of the sirens or 
to stifle the pleading that their music evokes from vulnerable hu-
mans. As a result, the decibel level on the legislative deck—the si-
rens’ song, combined with the course-change demands of those be-
witched by it—can get pretty loud. Think about how members of 
Congress from affected districts behaved whenever a new list of po-
tential base closings was announced. But this venting is harmless so 
long as the noise does not in fact translate into instructions that turn 
the ship onto the rocks. 82 
 Ordinary regulatory statutes can offer less dramatic but equally 
significant examples. Congress the institution passed Superfund long 
before the special interest calculus looked anything but hostile to its 
enactment. The existence of such interest group-unfriendly regula-
tory programs cannot simply be written off as the death-bed conver-
sion to public-regardingness of a lame-duck Congress and Presi-
                                                                                                                  
 80. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 
Stat. 1808 (1990) (charging an independent commission with the duty of identifying mili-
tary bases that should be closed or realigned, and providing that Congress and the Presi-
dent could approve or disapprove the recommended list only in its entirety, in order to pre-
vent “cherry-picking” individual, politically favored bases off the list). See generally Dalton 
v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994) (rejecting various challenges to the scheme). 
 81. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 
99 Stat. 1037 (1985) (creating an automatic mechanism for across-the-board spending re-
ductions whenever the Comptroller General estimated that the budget deficit for the com-
ing year would exceed a statutorily specified level) . See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714 (1986) (invalidating the scheme to the extent that it involved the Comptroller Gen-
eral). 
 82. Indeed (as my earlier metaphor of plumage display implies), allowing for such 
public venting behavior by individual members may serve a useful function for Congress 
the institution. Professor Croley perceptively recognizes this early in his paper. See, e.g., 
Croley, supra note 3, at 27 (suggesting that “legislators might [secretly] not mind . . . so 
much” that procedural moves like delegation to agencies provide insulation from interest 
group demands); see also id. at 46-47. However, he does not carry this suggestion into his 
analysis of the case studies. Given public choice’s thoroughgoing condemnation of Con-
gress, one can hardly blame him for hesitating to assert not only that some regulation 
might indeed be as public regarding as it seems, but also that Congress might actually be 
capable of strategies for institutional self-discipline. 
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dent.83 Consider the Endangered Species Act (ESA),84 another Con-
gressionally enacted regulatory program that pursues diffuse and 
broadly shared benefits by imposing significant particularized costs 
on farmers, developers, and industries such as logging. (Remember 
the distinction between fallibility and corruption; you don’t have to 
agree that these benefits are in fact worth the societal price tag.) The 
remarkable thing about the ESA from the public choice perspective is 
not that a Republican Congress responded to powerful private inter-
ests by giving the logging industry a lucrative timber salvage excep-
tion through a rider to an emergency appropriations bill, 85 and by ef-
fectively shutting down crucial aspects of the program through a 
year-long funding moratorium. 86 As we know, the appropriations pro-
cess can be particularly susceptible to dispensing special-interest fa-
vors because it disguises logrolling and facilitates other sorts of 
tradeoffs more effectively than does substantive legislation.87 The 
remarkable thing is that the program had been receiving funding 
from several congresses in spite of those powerful interests, and is 
now being funded again.88 
 One might also consider the procedures that Congress the institu-
tion is responsible for enacting and maintaining. Professor Croley ef-
                                                                                                                  
 83. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, was passed in December 1980, in the 
final days of the Carter presidency. 
 84. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 35, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994). 
 85. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance 
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194. 
 86. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Recissions for the Department 
of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, tit. 
II, ch. IV, 109 Stat. 73, 86. 
 87. If you regard the ESA as a monumentally wasteful and stupid program, and you 
consider the actions of the 104th Congress a principled vindication of the true public inter-
est, we share important common ground: Neither of us is persuaded by the public choice 
account that self-interested response to interest-group pressure is a sufficient explanation 
for legislative action. 
 88. To be sure, from the environmentalist perspective, one could argue that the pro-
gram has always been significantly underfunded. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, The Endan-
gered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Com-
merce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 303 (1993). The Fish & Wildlife Service has a substantial 
backlog of petitions to list species as endangered or threatened; it has designated “critical 
habitat” for only a small fraction of the species that have been listed; and it has not yet 
promulgated “species recovery plans” for a significant number of species denominated en-
dangered. But few regulatory programs are funded at a level sufficient to permit full ac-
complishment of their stated missions. Statutes perennially promise citizens more than 
appropriating legislatures supply the resources to deliver. See generally Frank H. Easte r-
brook, Substance & Due Process, 1982 SUP.  CT.  REV. 85 (noting several ways, including 
underfunding, that statutory promises often are not fully performed). The better question 
is how the ESA has historically fared relative to the “normal” distribution of regulatory 
underfunding. Although this question does not seem to have been addressed empirically, 
the anecdotal impression is certainly that the 104th Congress was unique in using appro-
priations cuts to debilitate the program to a degree that could not politically have been ac-
complished through substantive statutory amendment. 
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fectively makes the case that the rulemaking process can provide 
agencies some insulation from interest-group pressure; this process 
is, of course, a creature of statute. To be sure, the federal courts of 
appeals in the late 1960s and early 1970s have to take a great deal of 
credit (or blame) for embroidering on the basic APA framework. Still, 
Congress not only provided the initial, invitingly capacious structure, 
but also has refrained from unraveling this insulating embroidery—
even when the ossification literature of the early 1990s offered the 
cover of disinterested academic commentary that attacked its util-
ity.89 Even in the case of the arch-villain of public choice accounts, 
the congressional oversight committee, the story may be more com-
plex than public choice suggests. Current congressional procedures 
create the potential for considerable competition among oversight 
committees. According to its General Counsel, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) answers to seventy different House and 
Senate committees and subcommittees. 90 Obviously, some of those 
committees will be more significant players than others, but 
shouldn’t such oversight competition dilute the influence of the leg-
endarily powerful committee chair? And if dilution is the effect, then 
Congress is again behaving in ways that help it institutionally tran-
scend the self-serving temptations of its individual members. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps Ockham’s razor isn’t a valid scientific principle. 
Perhaps entities sometimes ought to be multiplied beyond the 
point of the simplest possible explanation. For the world is 
doubtless far odder and more complex than we ordinarily 
think.91 
 My purpose is not to suggest that the President is really a villain, 
or that Congress is an oft-misunderstood innocent. That would sim-
ply be countering the reductionism of public choice with a different 
sort of hyperbole. Rather, I want to warn of the power of myth. In 
their thoughtful critical introduction to the public choice literature, 
Dan Farber and Phil Frickey suggest that public choice, even with its 
shortcomings, “deserves to be taken seriously” because “even one-
sided and simplistic theories have their uses.”92 I want to suggest 
                                                                                                                  
 89. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1985); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency 
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995). See also JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, 
THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990). 
 90. Gary S. Guzy, Address to Administrative Law Class at Cornell Law School (Oct. 
20, 1999). 
 91. Letter from Aldous Huxley to Dr. Humphry Osmond (July 17, 1960), in LETTERS 
OF ALDOUS HUXLEY, 1953-1963, at 893-94 (Grover Smith ed., 1969). 
 92. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 11, at 5. 
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that simplistic theories, in particular, have their dangers—
particularly when they promise so much to a community trying to 
comprehend and improve a social practice as complex and controver-
sial as the modern administrative state. Who doesn’t long for simple 
solutions in a complicated world? 
 I want to encourage us not to give public choice so much power 
over how we perceive the regulatory universe. I want to encourage us 
to resist its invidious insistence that self-interest is the only motiva-
tion a sophisticated observer could take seriously. It’s easy to scoff at 
faith; it’s easy to demonstrate the illogic of hope. That’s why these 
qualities come under the heading of “virtues” rather than “intellec-
tual accomplishments.” But I don’t see that we, the community of 
those who believe in administrative law, have much choice but to 
choose virtue. For us, it’s despair in the capacity of humans, to create 
and to sustain public regarding institutions of government, that 
would be irrational. 
 Thus, I fully agree with Jerry Mashaw’s formulation of our goal: 
“The idea is to attempt to grasp some middle way between a naive 
faith in the public interest and a cynical campaign to eliminate col-
lective action wherever it rears its ugly head.”93 Clearly, there are 
components of positive political theory that are logically capable of 
being severed from public choice’s premise of universal self-interest, 
and applied regardless of assumptions about human motivation.94 
These components may be precisely the sorts of things that ought to 
be scavenged by administrative law scholars. 95 But, the failure rigor-
ously to distinguish predictions about behavioral patterns and organ-
izational dynamics that function regardless of a particular motiva-
tional assumption from propositions that depend on the premise of 
self-interest as the universal motivator, leads to the sorts of problems 
I have discussed here. And so where Professor Mashaw and I, per-
haps, part company is at my conviction that administrative law will 
not find the “middle way” between naïveté and nihilism until we un-
dertake to construct a self-consciously post-public choice theory. 
 
                                                                                                                  
 93. MASHAW, supra note 8, at 31. 
 94. I have suggested that the Spence-Cross model for rational, democratically legiti-
mate delegation to agencies is an example of this. See supra note 16. In the same vein, Ed 
Rubin points out that “[c]ollective choice issues (e.g., aggregated preferences) would arise 
even if people’s preferences were motivated by altruism or ideology; they would be elimi-
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